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MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT
of Imports to the US. from the U.S.S.R.
STANLEY D. METZGER*
No aspect of international trade between the United States and
the Soviet Union has received more attention in recent years than
the question of most-favored-nation treatment of Soviet imports
to the United States. Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment
means that imported articles from a country enjoying it can-
not be subjected to customs duties or other charges in connection
with importation, or rules and formalities, less favorable than
that which is accorded to like imported articles originating in
any other country. It is a rule, whether established by domestic
law of the importing country, or by international agreement, or
both, against discriminatory treatment of imports based upon
their place of origin.
Soviet imports to the United States have not enjoyed most-
favored-nation treatment since 1951-they have been subjected
to the duties specified in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
not to those duties as they have been reduced in trade agreements
with other countries concluded since the 1934 Trade Agreements
Act. In 1972, in conjunction with the conclusion of a Lend-Lease
Settlement Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union
negotiated a Trade Agreement' which provided for most-favored-
nation treatment of Soviet imports with respect to customs
duties, their internal taxation or distribution in the United States,
any charges upon transfers of payments for their importation,
and any rules or formalities in connection with their importation.
The Trade Agreement by its terms was to enter into force after
written notices of acceptance were exchanged, which it was
understood would take place following changes in U.S. domestic
law permitting MFN treatment to be accorded to Soviet imports.
The Trade Act of 1974, enacted on January 3, 1975, after much
travail, authorized MFN treatment to goods imported from the
Soviet Union under specified conditions, including assurances con-
cerning emigration of Jews and others from the Soviet Union,
and a limitation of $300 million on Exim Bank credits during a
4-year period, without further Congressional authorization. On
January 14, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger announced that
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Settlement of Lend Lease, Re-
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the Soviet Union had informed the United States Government
that "it would not put into force" the 1972 Trade Agreement,
because to do so would mean accepting "a trade status that is
discriminatory and subject to political conditions."" The result is
that for the near future, at least, MFN will continue not to be
accorded to Soviet imports to the United States.
This paper outlines the origins and status of the discriminatory
legal regime which existed from 1951-1974, and the likely eco-
nomic consequences of adoption or non-adoption of a most-
favored-nation system, in the process touching upon some of the
problems which have beset efforts to effectuate such a change.
A. The Legal Regime
Most-favored-nation treatment was accorded to Soviet imports
to the United States between 1934 and 1951. Under the Trade
Agreement Act of 1934,: as amended and extended until 1951,
any duty or other import restriction or duty-free treatment pro-
claimed in carrying out any trade agreement under the Trade
Agreements program was required as a matter of domestic
American law to be applied to products of "all foreign countries,
whether imported directly or indirectly. ' 4 This meant that tariff
reductions and bindings negotiated with other countries were
applied in like situations to imports from the U.S.S.R. While
MFN treatment could be suspended whenever a country dis-
criminated against American goods, such suspensions had oc-
curred infrequently, and not in respect of U.S.S.R. imports.5
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,6 which was con-
sidered and enacted during the active hostilities of the Korean
War, required the President to withdraw the application of MFN
treatment from products of the U.S.S.R. and certain other coun-
tries under its "domination or control." 7 The Administration had
not proposed this amendment of the 1934 Act. It was first pro-
posed by the minority of the Ways and Means Committee of the
United States House of Representatives during the Committee's
consideration of the extension bill," but only in respect of future
tariff concessions; it was rejected by the majority of the Com-
mittee, and then voted into the bill by the full House. When the
bill reached the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary of State
2 Dept. of State Press Conference, Jan. 14, 1975, p. 1 (PR 13/46).
, Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 943.
4 Id. 944.
5See T.D. 47600, 68 Tress. Dec. 470 (1935) (Germany); T.D. 48947, 71 Treas. Dvc. 707
(1937) (Australia).
6Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 73.
'Id. § 5.
H.R. Rep. No. 14, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1951).
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Acheson testified against it. 9 The "effects of this amendment
would be virtually nil," he pointed out, for it "would have little
effect upon the salability of dutiable Soviet products," and "would
not affect the salability of their duty-free products at all." The
Senate nonetheless rejected his position and even extended the
House prohibition to all trade concessions, past or future; the
resulting Act reflected the Senate position. At the same time the
Senate adopted an amendment prohibiting imports of Soviet
mink, sable, and other furskins, again over Administration oppo-
sition.10 This too found its way into the Act.
There is no doubt that the reason for the 1951 Congressional
action denying MFN treatment to Soviet imports was "political,"
as Secretary Kissinger characterized it in testimony to the Senate
Finance Committee in March, 1974.11 Congress was taking an op-
portunity at hand, the consideration of a trade bill, to indicate its
strong disapproval of Soviet support for North Korea, then in
combat with American armed forces, despite its awareness of the
extremely limited economic effect of its action. Indeed, this is but
one of many examples 12 in the area of controls over East-West
trade during the past twenty-five years in which the Congress
has taken a position far more restrictive than that of the Ad-
ministration. 13 In more general terms, they represent a familiar
occurrence in American politics-substantial domestic public
opinion concerning an international matter which differs
markedly from dominant official opinion relating thereto, and is
reflected in Congressional action in opposition to Administration
policy. The most recent of these has been Congressional mandat-
ing of a cessation of military aid to Turkey in the wake of the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus following the temporary overthrow of
Makarios by the then-ruling Greek military dictatorship.
The statutory denial of MFN treatment of Soviet imports was
reiterated in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, 14 and thus has con-
tinued for th.e past twenty-four years. Successive Administra-
tions sought ways to restore it, though with varying degrees
of intensity. The Eisenhower Administration indicated, in 1959-
60 discussions with the U.S.S.R. concerning a lend-lease settle-
ment (one of a number held from time to time without result
Hearings on H.R. 1612 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
3-10 (1951).
1 S. Rep. No. 291, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
" Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2 at 455 (1974).
i3E.g., The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (The Battle Act), 65 Stat.
644 (1951), as amended.
13 One of the rare exceptions took place in 1969 when the Administration opposed Sena-
tors Muskie and Mondale in their successful effort to loosen controls over U.S. exports to
the Soviet Union and certain other countries. The Administration wished to "link" this
relaxation to other matters affecting U.S.-Soviet relations. See Export Administration Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184.
14 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 231, 76 Stat. 872, 876 (1962).
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until 1972), that an atmosphere favorable to MFN restoration
could be created if a reasonable lend-lease settlement could be
negotiated. A bill proposed in the mid-1960s by the Johnson Ad-
ministration which would have authorized restoration of MFN
treatment, based on similar conditions, failed to secure sufficient
Congressional support to be reported out of committee.
Finally, in 1973, following the 1972 negotiations of a Trade
Agreement, a lend-lease settlement, and related agreements
reflecting a "detente" in U.S.-Soviet relations, the Nixon Admin-
istration sought similar authority in order to effectuate these
agreements. As in 1951, however, political considerations proved
to be a formidable obstacle to the Administration's proposal, in
this instance primarily because of Soviet restrictions upon Jewish
emigration. While these restrictions are more closely connected
with the "internal affairs" of a foreign state than, for example,
Soviet support of North Korean hostilities in 1951, it is difficult
to classify them as being wholly "internal." For they are among
that class of a nation's acts which are also "affected with an in-
ternational concern," the right to emigrate having been one of
the human rights (Article 13(2)) proclaimed by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 as a "common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations."
On October 10, 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee
reported out H.R. 10710,15 the "Trade Reform Act of 1973," with
changes in Title IV (relating to MFN for Soviet imports) which
added conditions upon the authority of the President to accord
MFN to Soviet imports. Under the bill, MFN could not be pro-
vided to the products of any "nonmarket economy" country that
1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, 2)
imposes more than iominal tax on emigration or on the visas or
other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or
cause whatsoever, or 3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy,
fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the
desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.
.MFN could be accorded only after the President submits a report
to the Congress indicating that such.country is not in violation
of "1),-2), or 3)." above. 16
The House of Representatives acted favorably upon H.R. 10710
on December 11, 1973, following two days of debate. However,
before doing so it adopted by a vote of 319 to 80 an amendment
to Title IV as it had been reported out-the so-called Vanik
Amendment.'1 The Vanik Amendment added to the denial of MFN
H.R. 10710, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
"Id. § 402.
"1 119 CONc. REc. 11064 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1973). Rep. Charles Vanik (D., Ohio) was the
House sponsor of the amendment.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. MFN
treatment to certain countries restricting emigration, the denial
of participation by any such country "in any program of the
Government of the United States which extends credits or credit
guarantees or investment guarantees, directly or indirectly,"
which means primarily Exim Bank loans.
In March 1974, when hearings upon the House-passed bill
began before the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary of State
Kissinger strongly opposed the Vanik Amendment (in the Senate
it was known as the Jackson Amendment after Senator Henry
Jackson (D., Wash.), the leading proponent of the measure), as
well as the denial of MFN treatment written into H.R. 10710 by
the House Ways and Means Committee.', The ensuing deadlock
over the emigration problem continued until October 18, 1974,
when Secretary Kissinger and Senator Jackson outlined a "com-
promise" in a public exchange of letters. 9
The Secretary of State informed the Senator that he had been
assured that the Soviet Government would adhere to the follow-
ing "criteria and practices" in its emigration policy: 20 no puni-
tive actions will be taken against the persons attempting to emi-
grate; no extraordinary administrative barriers will be raised
against those applying for emigration; applications for emigra-
tion will be processed on a non-discriminatory basis as regards
place of residence, race, religion, national origin and professional
status of the applicant; hardship cases will be given sympathetic
consideration; the collection of an emigration tax will remain
suspended; and the U.S. will be in a position to inform the Soviet
Government of any indications that these criteria are not being
followed. 1 Secretary Kissinger also stated that "it will be our
assumption" that with the application of these criteria the rate
of emigration from the U.S.S.R. would begin to rise promptly
from the 1973 level in correspondence with the number of appli-
cants.
In his letter to Secretary Kissinger, Senator Jackson listed a
series of "understandings" which conditioned his agreement to
modify the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Essentially, these "un-
derstandings" are additional specifications to the criteria listed
by Secretary Kissinger: the military draft will not be used
against those seeking to emigrate; criminal prosecution for at-
tempting to emigrate will be barred; adult applicants for emi-
gration will not have to receive permission from their parents or
relatives; persons "who have had access to genuinely sensitive
classified information" will not be impeded from emigrating; and
Is Supra note 10, at 456.
'
9 See 120 CONG. REc. No. 174, S21411-12 (Dec. 13, 1974) for texts of letters.2
o1d.
21Id.
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the "minimum standard of initial compliance" will be the issu-
ance of 60,000 visas per year by the Soviet Government.
22
The purpose of the exchange between Senator Jackson and
Secretary Kissinger was to obtain for the President a statutory
power of waiver of the restrictions imposed by Section 402 of the
Trade Act, which were summarized above. The Jackson amend-
ment of § 402, adopted 88-0 by the Senate on December 13, 1974,
allows the President to extend MFN treatment and to continue
granting credits to the Soviets for an initial period of eighteen
months,2 3 and thereafter under a complex procedure: one month
prior to the period's expiry the President could ask Congress for
a one-year renewal of his authority to waive the restrictions of
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment; the Congress could grant the
renewal by passing an affirmative concurrent resolution within
sixty days;24 if Congress did not pass such a resolution, the trade
benefits would continue unless either House of Congress voted
within forty-five days to discontinue them. 2
5
The Soviet Government did not publicly acknowledge the Kis-
singer-Jackson arrangement. Indeed, Secretary Kissinger made
clear in his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on
December 3, 1974, that a formal agreement on emigration from
the Soviet Union did not exist and could not be expected. 26 Secre-
tary Kissinger did not disclose, then or earlier, that on October
26, 1974, when he visited Brezhnev in Moscow, he had been given
a letter denouncing the Jackson-Vanik amendment and threaten-
ing rejection of the 1972 Trade Agreement. The Gromyko letter
was only released by the U.S.S.R. on December 18, 1974, on the
eve of final Congressional action on the Trade Act of 1974.27
B. The Economic Consequences
Various estimates of the possible growth of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
trade have been made, on varying hypotheses, were MFN to be
a reality. Given the development of economic relations in a setting
of political rapprochement, Ray Cline, former Director of the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, posited
a theoretical calculation of growth of U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R.
to about $2 billion annually, with Soviet imports amounting to
$1.7 billion.21 According to Cline, the achievement of such a vol-
-2Id.
" See note 19 at S21406-7. Another adopted amendment, the Harry Byrd amendment,
limits the amount of loans, guarantees, etc., to the Soviet Union to $300 million aggregate
for 4 years without prior Congressional approval. Supra note 19, at S21400.
A Id. at S21406-7.
m Id.
' N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1974, at 5, col. 3.
27 EAsT-WsT TaAPE COUNCIL, NEWsLaI'Rs (Vol. 3, No. 2, Jan. 31, 1975).
' 67 DEPr. o STATE BUL. 334, 338 (1972). For a generally more conservative assessment,
see N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1973. at 61, col. 1 (Shabad article).
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ume of trade would "take quite a few years," however, and the
"creation of more systematic division of labor between the two
countries."
What role would MFN play in this kind of projection? A study
by the staff of the U.S. Tariff Commission2 9 has indicated that
while tariff discrimination has "generally constituted less of a
handicap to U.S.S.R. trade than is commonly supposed," it none-
theless has affected adversely about 10 per cent (based on value)
of Soviet imports in 1970. The study pointed out, however, that
the traditional trade pattern between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States and "probably the deliberate actions of U.S. importers and
Soviet foreign-trade corporations, lead to a concentration in im-
ports of the items which avoid the full rates." It further noted,
however, that there were a number of Soviet products which
might well experience growth in exportation to the U.S. if MFN
were accorded, among them: plywood; manganese ore; ferro-
vanadium; steel wire rods, plates, sheets, and other shapes;
metalworking equipment; hydrofoil boats; electrical-generation
equipment; cotton and man-made fibers; and apparel.
30
Mere according of MFN treatment would work no magic.
Quality manufactures, "reliable and fast installation and repair
service," 3' 1 and effective merchandising are necessary to lasting
trade gains. Nonetheless, it seems clear that continuing denial of
MFN to Soviet imports will impede, and according MFN would
assist, the growth of U.S. U.S.S.R. trade in practical no less than
in psychological ways.
Conclusion
It is of course a truism that political considerations affect seri-
ously both the bilateral economic relations between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., and the other economic relationships which they
are in a position to influence. There has been a presumption in
the U.S. toward insulating "normal" economic intercourse from
political considerations-as evidenced by the 1934 Trade Agree-
ments Act. This presumption, while stronger in respect of deal-
ings with lesser powers, has been apparent, in degree, even in
bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. Unfortunately, or perhaps in-
evitably in Marxist-Leninist terms, there is no evidence that the
U.S.S.R. has practiced such "compartmentalization" in any of
its foreign policies, and little likelihood that it will innovate on
this score in the foreseeable future. Despite the fact that "link-
' F. MALISH, JR., UNITED STATES EAST EUROPEAN TRADE (U.S. Tariff Commission, Staff
Research Studies No. 4, 1972).
30 Id. 44.
31 Supra note 28, at 335.
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age" of the economic and political seems ordained for some time
to come, however, it would be most useful for the citizens of
both countries were political considerations at least to be con-
tained, and the development of trade relationships were to pro-
ceed on the basis of nondiscrimination and comparative advan-
tage in the production and distribution of goods and services.
Unless progress is made in this direction-and it takes actions,
including a certain forbearance in the face of smaller provoca-
tions by both countries to make it-the future of trade relations
will likely track fairly closely political relationships, with little
likelihood of long-term dependability. It is a pity, like so much
of what we have recently been witnessing.
